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1.0 Introduction: Malware in the World Today
Before identifying what makes a “good” piece of malware, it is important to identify the roll 
that malware performs in the world today. First, some basic terminology will be defined in order to 
ensure complete understanding of the subsequent material. The next step to examining malware is to 
understand the several different types and what their particular strengths and weaknesses are. 
Additionally, by examining multiple historical examples of malware, one can determine strategies that 
have worked in the past. After examining the technological artifact itself, one can then investigate who 
is creating malware and why, enabling them to understand the motivations behind this virtual epidemic. 
Next will be an examination of why malware is so prevalent in the world today, as well as several 
reasons why it is so hard to defend against. Finally, this section will attempt to compare and contrast 
reasons for either creating or not creating malware for testing purposes.
1.1 Definition of Terms
Attacker: A malicious user who is attempting to compromise a system's confidentiality, integrity, 
availability, or some combination thereof.
Confidentiality: The system only gives information to individuals or processes who are authorized to 
access that information.
Integrity: The system functions as intended and nothing else (Nico).
Availability: The system can be utilized by authorized users when they desire to use it.
Malware: A series of malicious instructions executed in order to exploit either a logic error or a coding 
error (Orton).
Payload: The portion of a piece of malware that actually performs a function. While the rest of the 
code is generally dedicated to infiltrating a system or obfuscating the presence of the malware, the 
payload is what actually accomplishes goals like opening a backdoor or stealing information (Heidari).
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Code Error: An error in the way that the software was written while implementing a correct piece of 
logic. Code errors are the most frequently encountered errors but they are also the easiest to fix (Orton).
Logic Error: An error inherent in the underlying functionality of a piece of software. These errors are 
rarer than code errors, but they are also much more difficult to discover and fix (Orton). For example, 
attackers exploit the way that web servers respond to requests by conducting Denial of Service attacks.
Denial of Service (DOS): Issuing repeated resource-intensive commands to a computer or server in 
order to deny its availability to normal users (Heidari).
Distributed Denial of Service (DDOS): Utilizing a network of computers to commit a massive DOS 
attack. Examples include the Low-Orbital-Ion-Cannon, a piece of software which can be operated in 
“hivemind” mode; this allows all connected computers to function as a single controlled network to 
attempt a DDOS attack (Johnson). DDOS attacks are harder to defend against than traditional DOS 
attacks as there is no single attacker to block all communications from.
Zero Day Exploit: An exploit which is unknown to anyone but the attacker. The name is due to the 
exploit existing on the 0th day of the vendor's response cycle. These exploits are jealously guarded and 
sold for a premium on the black market (Miller).
Rooted: A machine that has been infected by a rootkit. A rootkit is a piece of malware that allows 
privileged access to the attacker while also masking its presence from the user. They allow undetected 
control over a system and can be particularly insidious to remove (McAfee).
Zombie: A remotely controlled system which is connected to the Internet. This is typically used to 
launch attacks that are more difficult to trace back to the original attacker, or as components of DDOS 
attacks (Heidari). 
Zombie Army: A collection of individual zombie system that is controlled from a central entity. Also 
known as a botnet (McAfee).
Exfiltrate: Secretly getting data out of a system through either unauthorized media or covert channels 
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(Rowe, Counterplanning). This is the opposite of infiltration, which is to secretly access a system.
1.2 Types of Malware
While the general public generally refers to all malware as a virus, there are actually several 
distinct classifications of malware. One of the fundamental differences which serves to characterize 
different forms of malware is whether or not it requires a host program in order to execute. A piece of 
code which requires a host program can be further differentiated by whether or not the hostile code was 
intended to be a part of that program. If the code has been injected by the original author, it is most 
likely to be either a trap door, a logic bomb, or a Trojan horse. A trap door, also known as a back door, 
is used to allow the original author of the code access to the program while bypassing the usual security 
features. These can be left for valid reasons, such as allowing for updates, testing, or access in the event 
of errors. However, these can also be exploited in order to achieve complete control of a system 
without the end-user's permission (Heidari). While a trap door can have valid reasons for its existence, 
a developer would have to do substantial amounts of backpedaling in order to justify including a logic 
bomb in a piece of software. A logic bomb is malicious code which is placed within a piece of software 
and activates once a set of predefined conditions is met (Heidari). It can be something as simple as the 
system connecting to the Internet for the first time, or it can be a complex precondition which requires 
a specific date, time, and IP address. Once the precondition is met, the malicious code is executed with 
the legitimate software's set of permissions. In order to be truly classified as an exploit, the logic bomb 
generally executes some destructive or security-compromising action while informing the original 
author that a victim is ready for exploitation (Heidari). The final preconfigured exploit is known as a 
Trojan. A Trojan horse, more commonly referred to as a Trojan, is named after the famous military 
gambit from Greek mythology. It masquerades as a useful program while actually containing additional 
exploit functionality. The difference between a Trojan and a logic bomb is the fact that a Trojan 
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generally does not have any preconditions to activating its payload other than first execution (Heidari).
The final form of host dependent malware, the ubiquitous virus, is different from the previous 
classifications by two important factors. First, the virus code is generally not placed in the host program 
by the original host author, but injected by an attacker at a later time. Additionally, viruses are able to 
replicate on their own, which makes them particularly dangerous (McAfee). A computer virus mimics a 
biological virus in the manner that it attaches to an otherwise healthy program and injects its own code 
into the existing program (Wassenaar, Blaser). A typical virus will add its exploit code to the end of a 
program as well as two separate jump instructions (Heidari). The first jump will be placed at the start of 
the program and will cause it to execute the exploit code before performing its normal duties. The 
second jump instruction will hop back to the normal program, functioning as if nothing untoward had 
happened (Heidari). Viruses are characterized by what they infect and how they propagate through an 
infected system (Heidari). An important fact to consider is that all viruses require some interaction 
from the user in order to begin their appointed mission (McAfee). This is why computer viruses have 
been compared to sexually transmitted diseases, as they require specific behavioral practices in order to 
spread (Wassenaar, Blaser).
The next type of malware is unique in the fact that it requires neither a host program nor any 
form of specific user interaction in order to achieve infection (McAfee). The innocuously named worm 
has been likened to socially transmitted diseases such as influenza, as it spreads to and infects all 
vulnerable systems (Wassenaar, Blaser). A worm is a fully self-contained program which utilizes 
specific security exploits and propagation techniques in order to achieve the maximum infection across 
the world (Heidari). While the actual payload of a worm may only be activated when it satisfies a 
certain set of preconditions, the typical worm will infect everything possible. As they do not require 
user interaction to achieve infection and utilize each infected machine as a new distribution point, the 
spread of worms is typically exponential and can pose “serious risks to the internet infrastructure as a 
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whole” (Heidari). Worms generally exist along a continuum with speed on one end and stealth on the 
other. A worm which spreads as fast as possible will conduct many scans of potential victims and cause 
network communications to appear anomalous when viewed over time (Weaver, Paxson, Staniford, 
Cunningham). The stealthier worms rely on passive propagation, only passing themselves along to new 
victims by embedding themselves within normal communications (Weaver, Paxson, Staniford, 
Cunningham). These stealthy worms cause infected machines to appear normal for longer periods of 
time, delaying any potential reaction to the malware. Additionally, worms can be distributed with or 
without payloads. While it may seem useless to have a worm which reaches half the world without 
actually doing anything, these apparently harmless worms are often used to test new infection vectors 
(Knapp, Boulton). 
Now that the different types of malware have been examined, it is possible to evaluate a few 
historical examples to learn more about them.
1.3 Historical Examples of Malware
On November 29th, 2010 Iran's government confirmed that its nuclear program had been 
damaged by malware known as the Stuxnet worm (Nicoll, Delaney). The worm was a self-replicating 
piece of software which utilized intelligence of the particular industrial controller used by Iran's Natanz 
plant to locate its target. This act of premeditated sabotage was designed to delay Iran's attempt at 
acquiring enriched Uranium and appears to have been a joint effort by Israel and the United States 
(Gross). The worm was incredibly technically sophisticated, it contained four zero day exploits to help 
it accomplish its goal of sabotage. Stuxnet spread throughout the globe, infecting Windows 64-bit 
machines and checking each system it infected to see if it had found its true target. The worm spread to 
any USB thumb drives which were plugged into an infected system enabling it to infiltrate networks 
with no connection to the public Internet. Relying on lax thumb-drive discipline and poor IT security in 
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Iran, the worm was then transferred from infected personal networks to the closed network at the 
Natanz plant (Gross). Once the worm verified that it had reached its target, it rooted the Programmable 
Logic Controller manufactured by the Siemens corporation and used at the plant (Nicoll, Delaney). The 
worm then rapidly oscillated the operating frequency of the gas-enrichment centrifuges while reporting 
nothing amiss to technicians monitoring the system (Gross). This caused a rapid deterioration of the 
centrifuges, destroying an unknown number utilized for enriching Uranium before finally being 
discovered (Gross). Outgoing Israeli Intelligence Chief Meir Dagan commented on the setback to Iran's 
nuclear program, claiming “Iran won't reach its nuclear capabilities before 2015” (Nicoll, Delaney). IT 
Security Analyst Ralph Langer claimed that the cyber attack was, “...nearly as effective as a military 
strike, but even better since there are no fatalities and no full-blown war” (Nicoll, Delaney). This piece 
of malware serves to demonstrate the ability for software to affect items in the physical world as well 
as herald an oncoming age of true cyber warfare.
Other examples can be used to examine particular methods of manipulating vulnerable users. 
The ILOVEYOU worm of 2000 originated in the Philippines and employed social engineering to 
spread around the World. The worm arrived as an attachment in an email with the subject line 
“ILOVEYOU” (Wassenaar, Blaser); this enticed users to open the attachment, wanting to see someone 
professing their love. In reality, the attachment contained no love letter and instead spread by sending 
itself to individuals on the infected system's email list, purporting to be from the victim (Rikstep). The 
cycle then repeated itself as acquaintances of the newly infected victim let their curiosity get the better 
of them and opened the attachment. This particular piece of malware shows how effective social 
engineering can be, as the worm employed both an intriguing message and appeared to be from 
someone that the user knew (Rikstep).
The SQLslammer worm stands out due to the incredible speed of its infection. Indeed, the worm 
ended up infecting over 90% of all vulnerable hosts within 10 minutes of its initial release (Heidari). 
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SQLslammer was an incredibly small worm, it fit into a single 404 byte UDP packet; this allowed for 
the worm to simply send itself out to a potential victim and not have to wait for a response before 
attacking (Heidari). The worm's random number generator, utilized to determine where to attack next, 
ended up having a bug which left a large number of potential victims unscanned and unattacked 
(Heidari). The worm serves as an important example of how knowledge of technical processes allows 
for the creation of a true terror of the Internet. It also demonstrates the importance of testing all code 
for bugs, including malware. Had the creator fully tested the random number generator, the attack 
could have been even more devastating.
1.4.0 Analyzing the Attackers
According to Scott Orton, Raytheon's Director of System Integrity Programs, attackers are 
composed of three separate attributes: objectives, capabilities, and behaviors. Objectives are what the 
attacker hopes to accomplish through their malfeasance and can be categorized into the following: 
Personal Power, Profit, Political/Military, and Other. The capabilities of attackers are defined by what 
they can and cannot do to a system. Finally, the behaviors of attackers are human psychological 
tendencies that Mr. Orton claims are largely the same between attackers and remain mostly constant for 
each individual over time.
1.4.1.0 Objectives
By analyzing an attacker's objectives, one can finally answer what many users must wonder 
after they have been attacked by malware: “why did this happen to me?” When viewing an attack as a 
several stage process, it is easier to realize some of the collateral damage that occurs when otherwise 
inconsequential civilians become infected with malware. Indeed, it appears that while many civilians 
are impacted by malware, it is often in pursuit of some greater goal.
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1.4.1.1 Personal Power: The desire for personal power is a motivation that can be easily 
understood by an outsider. Whether it is an individual seeking to improve their station in life through 
illicit means, or to acquire power over other individuals, malware can be utilized to further these goals. 
As an example, if an attacker compromised a powerful individual's system and discovered 
incriminating information within, they could then extort that individual to do what they wanted. In a 
work environment, the attacker could force the victim to give them a raise or other benefits that would 
advance their station in life.
Another potential way to increase personal power is by refining knowledge, thereby making 
future attacks more likely to succeed. If an attacker sends out a test attack to verify that a particular 
exploit exists and functions as intended, this can be seen as gathering power in order to make a future 
attack successful. Additionally, an attacker can compromise a system and create a zombie in order to 
utilize it in future attacks. Zombies are useful for numerous activities such as bypassing spam filters, 
attempting DDOS attacks (Heidari), attacking allegedly secure systems from unexpected origins, and 
making proper attribution for future attacks difficult (Dhamankar, Dausin, Eisenbarth, and King). As 
such, increasing personal power through malware attacks appears to be a valid, if unethical, motivation.
1.4.1.2 Profit: Recent years have caused a shift in potential motivations as the increased 
capabilities of malware have allowed for attackers to generate a monetary profit from their creations. 
There are two major categories of achieving profit from malware, one is directly malicious while the 
other is only questionably so. One utilizes knowledge in the form of a cyber attack in order to attain a 
direct monetary benefit; the other acts as an enabler for other individuals who may or may not have 
malicious intentions.
Those attackers who choose to engage in directly malicious actions have a plethora of 
Robertson 11
opportunities available to make a profit. The ability to extract a profit from compromised systems has 
allowed for malware to finally be considered a successful biological parasite (Furnell, Ward, Malware). 
By compromising a system, the attacker gains several assets. At the most basic level, they gain access 
to the data stored on the system. If that data is incriminating, they could use it to blackmail the owner 
of that system. If the data is particularly sensitive, the attacker could instead sell it to a different party 
in order to make a quick profit. This appears to be quite common because in 2002 a survey of 498 
members of various organizations reported that 40% claimed to have “received confidential 
information belonging to other companies via the Internet” (Knapp, Boulton). In addition to exfiltrating 
sensitive information, competitors could pay for attackers to introduce errors into their opponent's 
products, or perform other acts of sabotage.
Another potential for profit treats the compromised machine as a resource to utilize for future 
attacks. By turning the infected machine into a zombie, the attacker gains another member in a virtual 
army. After a zombie army of suitable size has been assembled, attackers can attempt DDOS attacks to 
bring down servers of online businesses. Online gambling sites appear to be common targets, with 
some reporting demands from Russian crime syndicates of $50,000 in order to call off the attack 
(Furnell, Ward, Malware). Additionally, attackers can instead sell or rent out their zombie armies to 
spammers or other organized crime syndicates. Attackers can rent out the processing power and 
bandwidth of their zombie army for as little as $100 an hour (Furnell, Ward, Malware).
While all of the above actions are unquestionably malicious, the other option available for profit 
resides in a gray area. Instead of utilizing the exploit that the attacker has developed by creating a piece 
of malware and directly attacking other systems, the attacker can simply sell the exploit itself. This 
raises a whole issue of other problems, as they must somehow demonstrate to potential buyers that the 
exploit works without giving away any information that would allow the buyers to recreate the exploit 
on their own (Miller). Additionally, at some point the attacker must provide their exploit to the buyer 
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and the buyer must provide the money to the attacker; this causes a whole new set of problems. 
Without the presence of a trusted third party who will hold both assets in escrow, either the attacker 
must provide the exploit and trust that the buyer will pay, or the buyer must first provide the money and 
trust the attacker to provide the exploit (Miller). Currently there is a distinct lack of a trusted third party 
for exploits, therefore it is almost impossible to guarantee simultaneous delivery of goods (Miller).
The reason that the sale of exploits resides in a gray area of maliciousness is due to the fact that 
the original attacker has no control over what is done with the exploit after selling it. While it could be 
sold to a legitimate source such as several penetration testing firms or a government agency (Miller), it 
can also be sold to criminal organizations. Even the supposedly legitimate buyers can utilize the 
exploits for dubiously ethical purposes or sell it to someone else. Therefore profiting from the sale of 
exploits is unclear regarding its maliciousness.
1.4.1.3 Political/Military Goals: There are four major forms of attacks which are motivated by 
political or military goals; these appear to be differentiated by whether they are primarily conducted by 
states or nonstate actors. Whereas states are typically concerned with cyber war and economic 
espionage, nonstate actors appear to concern themselves with cybercrime and cyber terrorism (Nye). 
By examining each form individually, it is possible to better understand the whole.
Cyber warfare is defined as “...cyber-actions that have effects outside cyberspace that amplify 
or are equivalent to physical violence...” (Nye). There are few public examples of cyber warfare in 
practice under this definition, yet the Stuxnet worm serves as a perfect case. As the interconnectedness 
provided by the Internet increases worldwide, so do potential targets for cyber warfare (Nugent, 
Raisinghani). Power grids, water sanitation plants, government communication channels, and military 
security stations all provide tempting targets for cyber war planners. However, there are two major 
arguments against attempting cyber warfare in an attempt to destroy an opponent's infrastructure. First, 
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“[evidence] seems to suggest that it is unlikely that cyber terrorists or other war planners could cause 
meaningful damage to critical infrastructures through cyber warfare tactics” (Owen). However, this can 
be remedied by instead attacking several non-critical services in order to both plant a foothold for 
future attacks and to erode public confidence in the system itself. After all, “decreased use of a system 
due to lack of confidence is in many ways the same as if a part of the system had been destroyed in a 
huge single attack” (Owen). The total cost of malicious software in 2003 alone was approximately $13 
billion; attacking nation states can take note and conduct cyber warfare with the goal of economic 
damage rather than the destruction of critical infrastructure (Owen). The second problem inherent in 
states building an arsenal of exploits is that maximum effectiveness will be achieved by immediately 
releasing the exploit. Each day the exploit isn't used, the chances increase that someone else will 
discover the exploit and bring attention to it (Miller). Additionally, the exploit could be fixed in a 
seemingly unrelated patch, causing the stockpiled exploit to become useless against updated systems 
(Miller). The only way to effectively mitigate this fact is to attack as soon as an exploit is discovered. 
Machiavelli maintains that attacking as soon as a state has the capability is a just action by claiming 
that, “...war is not to be avoided, it is only to be put off to the advantage of others...” (Machiavelli). 
However, an immediate strike with cyber weapons may be less effective than waiting for  a later date 
as individual cyber attacks are generally highly effective only once; this is because survivors will be 
able to adapt to the methods utilized for that specific attack (Rowe, Ethics). This leaves war planners in 
a difficult position as they must gamble for the correct time to unleash their new weapons.
Economic Espionage is the other form of cyber attack which states engage in. As first world 
nations find their economies increasingly dependent upon the Internet and other information networks, 
they become more vulnerable to outside influence (Nye). It appears that currently the private sector is 
actually the primary target of information warfare; this is partially due to the difficulty inherent in any 
military retaliation (Knapp, Boulton). While some individuals might believe that it is only developing 
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nations who are conducting economic espionage in order to gain an advantage, data simply does not 
support this. Indeed, the former director of French Intelligence publicly admitted that French 
Intelligence acquires confidential information about competitors and forwards this data on to French 
companies (Knapp, Boulton). Additionally, the CIA released a warning to US companies outsourcing 
the fix for the Y2K bug that offshore companies were installing backdoors to allow their host 
governments remote access to the updated software (Nugent, Raisinghani). These are just two proven 
events of economic espionage, but one can extrapolate that other nations with information warfare 
capabilities are also engaging in these actions.
Actions commonly undertaken by nonstate actors are cybercrime and cyber terrorism. While 
cybercrime is politically or militarily motivated mostly in the choice of targets, cyber terrorism is 
entirely different. Cyber terrorism is defined as “the premeditated, politically motivated attacks against 
information, computer-systems, computer programs, and data which result in violence against non-
combatant targets by sub-national groups or clandestine agents” (Curran, Concannon, McKeever). 
Many of the factors which lead to the prevalence of malware and cyber attacks also benefit cyber 
terrorism and will be examined in a future section. Academics believe that the combination of cyber 
terrorism and conventional physical terrorism is the most effective use of cyber terrorism (Curran, 
Concannon, McKeever). Potential combinations include the delay of crisis response teams following a 
traditional attack, which would further exacerbate the damage and chaos caused. Another option is to 
utilize cyber terrorism in order to allow for traditional terrorism to strike at otherwise protected targets; 
this can be by either drawing response teams away from the target or allowing individuals to infiltrate 
past existing security measures. Historical cyber terrorism events are not as sophisticated and have 
generally been classified as low-level information warfare because they mostly consist of website 
defacing, spamming to disrupt communications, and intercepting communications in order to weaken 
organizations (Curran, Concannon, McKeever). The European Union has responded to the possibility 
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of more severe cyber terrorist attacks by mandating that “attacks through interference with an 
information system” be punishable as a terrorist action if the goal is “seriously altering or destroying 
the political, economic, or social structures” (Curran, Concannon, McKeever). This growing awareness 
of cyber terrorism as a valid form of attack will doubtlessly increase the number of attacks in upcoming 
years.
1.4.1.4 Other Goals: The remaining motivations can be broken down according to human 
emotion. These can be curiosity, pride, rage, and others. Steven Furnell and Jeremy Ward claim that 
“Malware writers have never been known for their public-spirited activity, so if they are electing not to 
directly harm our systems there must be something in it for them”(Furnell, Ward, Malware). While 
they mostly draw attention to the profit available for the creators of malware, these benefits can also be 
psychological. While the original hackers were seen as mostly curious individuals, one can imagine 
other psychological benefits individuals can gain from conducting cyber attacks. The original pieces of 
malware appear to have been motivated by a combination of curiosity as to how systems work as well 
as ego. This is demonstrated by the original payloads being rather flashy, with the objective of being 
seen and gaining recognition for the attacker(Furnell, Ward, Malware). As there were few prior 
examples to compare to, relatively simple attacks were enough to gain recognition(Furnell, Ward, 
Malware). However, the increase in sophistication has resulted in attackers creating more devious 
exploits and obsessively guarding their methods in order to gain respect from other attackers (Rowe, 
Duong, Cutsy). Indeed, it seems that the number of machines exploited is a measure of the skill of a 
hacker within the community (Rowe, Duong, Cutsy).
In addition, there is the chance that attackers are responding out of rage or vengeance for a 
perceived slight. The organization known as Anonymous is famous for declaring crusades against 
particular groups due to both perceived slights and “for the lulz” (Davies). This has caused some 
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attackers to be labeled as “socially maladapted manchildren” due to responding to online insults with 
cyber attacks (Unknown). While this does not paint a flattering image of attackers, it is easy to imagine 
certain immature individuals utilizing their knowledge to exploit the machines of those who have 
wronged them.
1.4.2 Capabilities
Capabilities are what the attacker is able to do to a system. Some of these capabilities come from 
failure analysis tools, where the attacker experiments with access controls in unique or novel ways and 
finds an edge case which will allow access to the system (Orton). Attackers seek to discover either 
Code Errors or Logic Errors, with the latter being more valuable (Orton). It is important to note that 
attackers and defenders are locked in a virtual arms race which results in capabilities staying in 
lockstep with advances in security (Orton). However, traditional access controls have been studied for a 
substantial amount of time, which results in major innovation being quite rare (Rowe, Designing). 
Capabilities vary widely between attackers, ranging from “determined adversaries with serious 
motivations” to simple “script kiddies” (Rowe, Counterplanning). In spite of this, the presence of a 
database of over 6,000 sites which contains only “a part of the better hacker tools” allows even 
unsophisticated attackers to quickly learn more (Knapp, Boulton). This increase in knowledge will 
allow for an increase in capabilities, which is something all defenders should worry about.
1.4.3 Behaviors
Behaviors are the psychologically motivated traits which are present in attackers. While attackers are 
by no means a homogenous group with uniform characteristics, one can still analyze traits which 
appear prevalent within the more successful members of the group. Attackers avoid monitoring due to 
the fact that they thrive on subtlety and concealment in order to achieve maximum effectiveness 
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(Rowe, Duong, Cutsy). Due to the access of training tools, attackers can also be highly skilled (Orton). 
They also tend to be methodical, making repeated attempts at a first compromise (Orton). This is 
exemplified by an embittered Australian employee who took 45 attempts to release 1 million liters of 
raw sewage into the river and coastal waters of Queensland (Curran, Concannon, McKeever). At the 
same time, once attackers have successfully accomplished an attack, they tend to create a process 
which they follow for future attacks (Orton). These processes are generally automated in the form of 
attack scripts; however these automated scripts often lack sufficient conditional statements to react 
correctly to any unexpected deviations from the plan (Rowe, Duong, Cutsy). Additionally, attackers 
generally trust in their senses and what systems report to them (Rowe, Counterplanning). Attackers 
generally assume that if they encounter a system that resembles something they have seen before, it 
will be the same as what they have encountered previously (Orton). This can be exploited by defenders, 
who can utilize deception against attackers in order to mislead and prevent them from accomplishing 
their objectives (Rowe, Counterplanning). As psychological traits generally remain constant within 
individuals while capabilities change (Orton), defenders should target specific behaviors rather than 
specific capabilities in order to achieve maximum return for the least amount of effort.
1.5 Why Malware is so Prevalent
Several factors combine to lead to the prevalence of malware in the world today. These run the 
gamut from lax laws preventing it to the difficulty inherent in correctly locating an attacker or 
responding in real time. One of the primary reasons for the abundance of malware is the extremely low 
cost of entry inherent in a cyber attack (Nye). This low cost is due to a variety of reasons. First, the cost 
of the delivery mechanism, the Internet, is much lower than the cost associated with a traditional attack 
such as guns and individuals who will use them. Additionally, some attacks require less technical 
knowledge than in the early days of cyber weaponry; the availability of downloadable graphical user 
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interface tools directly led to the removal of many barriers for entry (Knapp, Boulton). As an example, 
guides exist that allow unsophisticated users to create electromagnetic pulse bombs for as little as $400 
in parts (Knapp, Boulton). While not technically malware, these devices allow attackers to target 
systems in a similar manner by denying availability for legitimate users. Another source of cost 
reduction is in the fact that the Internet allows for attackers to target systems anywhere in the world 
without paying transportation costs traditionally associated with such gambits. Furthermore, the 
presence of approximately 1.7 billion individuals on the Internet (Nye) allows for an attacker to choose 
a valid target within a wide array of options without paying an additional cost (Nugent, Raisinghani). 
The costs inherent in undertaking a cyber attack are primarily limited to the development and initial 
seeding of the attack, as both the Internet and infected servers are available to all attackers with skill 
and patience (Nugent, Raisinghani).
Another factor leading to the prevalence of malware is the fact that correct attribution is nearly 
impossible in cyberspace (Rowe, Ethics). While several methods exist to attempt to trace a signal with 
varying degrees of legality (Arnes), even these can be bypassed by clever attackers. Many sites which 
maintain information about IP addresses, DNS addresses, and user information lack any form of 
editorial control (Arnes); clever attackers can seed incorrect information about their location in order to 
throw off searches. Indeed, it is possible to perform a “false-flag attack” in which an attacker seeds 
information and appears to be from a different nation in order to throw suspicions to an innocent group 
(Rowe, Ethics). This is similar to hiring mercenaries to wear the uniforms of another nation and is 
prohibited in normal warfare but not in cyberspace (Rowe, Ethics). Clever attackers can utilize other 
methods of obfuscation such as TOR networks and anonymous IP addresses to further hinder tracing 
(Arnes). Additionally, attacks made through zombie systems will allow for yet another degree of 
separation between the attacker and the final target (Heidari). All of these systems combine to ensure 
that discovering who actually made an attack is exceedingly difficult. An attacker motivated by pride 
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may sign their work, but there is still no guarantee that the signature is actually from the author and not 
someone masquerading as them. This anonymity has allowed attackers to not fear potential 
repercussions from their actions, causing Machiavelli's advice to only attack when you will completely 
crush the enemy and prevent any chance of retaliation to hold less importance (Machiavelli). This lack 
of attribution has been analyzed by academics as well as fiction writers (Suarez) and remains yet 
another reason that malware is so prevalent.
The international community lacked any form of unified cybercrime laws for quite some time, 
which further motivated the creation of malware. The Convention on Cybercrime has sought to 
establish these laws through a treaty between numerous nations, but it has drawn its own shares of 
detractors (Kierkegaard). Ratified in 2006 by the US, the treaty makes several actions illegal, including 
“to create, possess, or acquire any computer program designed to crack or disrupt systems illegally” 
(Kierkegaard). It is important to note that writing malware for the “testing or protection of a computer 
system” would not impose criminal liability, but it is questionable how this will be upheld in court 
(Kierkegaard). While it may seem that the ratification of this treaty would drive the production of 
malware down, a vast majority of states have not ratified the treaty, citing the fact that the process 
excluded legal experts and human rights advocates (Kierkegaard). Furthermore, the treaty is under 
scrutiny by several states who have expressed a desire to impose procedural safeguards for limiting 
surveillance powers (Kierkegaard). This will likely result in many attackers ignoring the treaty as it 
may be changed radically before being adopted worldwide. Finally, even if the treaty were to be 
completely adopted, the lack of guaranteed attribution would most likely cause only unskilled attackers 
to fear the laws. This could result in the only malware authors being sophisticated users who take 
lengthy steps to prevent their identities from being established, while making sure to cause other users 
to appear to be the ones responsible for attacks they commit.
Another factor contributing to malware's preeminent presence in the online ecosystem is the fact 
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that it is impossible to truly prevent attacks, one can only delay or mitigate them (Schneidewind). 
Professor Neil C. Rowe of the Naval Postgraduate Institute maintains that “it is unfeasible for a 
military organization... to think their systems cannot be compromised by determined adversaries with 
serious motivations” (Rowe, Counterplanning). As such, academics argue that if attacks cannot be 
prevented one should instead focus on mitigating them (Rowe, Designing). Malware writers 
acknowledge this fact, but seek to be efficient with their time and generally target the machines that are 
easiest to compromise unless motivated to target a specific system (Orton). If an attacker is willing to 
invest the time and resources into compromising a system, they generally will be able to accomplish 
this goal (Orton). Simply looking at examples of polymorphic shellcode online demonstrates the effort 
attackers are willing to invest in compromising specific systems (Offensive Security). Additional 
reasons for the difficulty of preventing attacks will follow in the next section.
1.6 Why Malware is Hard to Defend Against
Part of the reason that attacks are so difficult to prevent is due to the fact that users of 
commercial software cannot do much to protect themselves. As a majority of the infrastructure of the 
Internet is controlled by private sector entities such as the ISPs or ICANN (Schneidewind), there are 
few countermeasures available for end users to employ. Even were an organization to utilize the most 
up-to-date security protocols, a single unpatched flaw in a commercial operating system or frequently 
used program could render them all moot (Schneidewind). Malware writers have realized this fact and 
adjusted their tactics accordingly, exploiting client-side vulnerabilities in commercial software as the 
primary infection vector against systems with internet access (Dhamankar, Dausin, Eisenbarth, and 
King). These infected machines are then used to spread the malware to other machines within the 
network, which were incorrectly thought to be protected from outside influence (Dhamankar, Dausin, 
Eisenbarth, and King). Once a company has discovered a vulnerability, it typically takes twice as long 
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for a patch to be applied to client-side software than an operating system (Dhamankar, Dausin, 
Eisenbarth, and King). Some vulnerabilities have remained unpatched for up to two years after their 
initial discovery (Dhamankar, Dausin, Eisenbarth, and King).
This time delay for patching brings up yet another difficulty in defending against malware and 
cyber attacks, the inability to respond in real-time. According to IEEE, the definition of real-time is, 
“Pertaining to a system or mode of operation in which computation is performed during the actual time 
that an external process occurs, in order that the computation results can be used to control, monitor, or 
respond in a timely manner to the external process” (Schneidewind). In order to respond to a malware 
attack, several steps must be accomplished. First, the attack must be detected. As many pieces of 
malware exercise extreme subtlety, this can be more difficult than expected(Furnell, Ward, Malware). 
Next, an effective defense would have to understand exactly what is being attacked in order to correctly 
choose what to protect (Schneidewind). Finally, the actual countermeasures must be deployed in order 
to defeat or mitigate the attack (Schneidewind). As this last step involves a decision of what 
countermeasures are most applicable and appropriate as well as the actual bandwidth to accomplish 
them, this is a definite time investment. All of this adds up to a substantial amount of time even without 
any human input. As a human decision process will be assumed to take at least longer than one second, 
this is an eternity in computational time. With a 1GHz processor, that one second delay is an additional 
billion cycles for the malware to accomplish its goal. Taking all of these steps into account, it is highly 
unlikely that a system will be able to respond to a cyber attack in real time.
Another valid strategy for preventing attacks is to inspire fear into potential enemies 
(Machiavelli). As has been established earlier, the lack of a valid counterattack strategy causes 
attackers to lose much of the fear which would be inherent in a traditional physical attack. In addition 
to being illegal in most jurisdictions, counterattacking in cyberspace is laced with so many difficulties 
relating to collateral damage against civilians that it is simply not an effective or moral strategy (Rowe, 
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Ethics). This combines with the fact that it appears immoral to react too strongly to cybercrime 
(Kierkegaard) to leave defenders with a dearth of valid options other than mitigation. All of these 
factors combine to prevent the cyber equivalent of mutually assured destruction, which was used as a 
form of nuclear deterrence during the Cold War (Dunn).
A different factor which causes cyber defense to be so difficult is the relative stagnation of 
security technologies. While attacker capabilities seem to advance daily, new innovations in access 
controls remain rare (Rowe, Designing). Indeed, there has been a significant worldwide increase in the 
number of zero day vulnerabilities discovered in the past several years (Dhamankar, Dausin, 
Eisenbarth, and King). There are several potential reasons for this increase, ranging from a shortage of 
skilled researchers (Dhamankar, Dausin, Eisenbarth, and King) to the fact that there has already been 
substantial research into the “first line of defense” (Rowe, Designing). However, one particularly 
fascinating rationalization explains this gap by analyzing the Internet as a biological ecosystem. If we 
assume that attackers occupy the role of predators in a traditional ecosystem and that the defenders are 
prey, an interesting relationship is demonstrated. Selection pressure is the process through which 
preferable traits are passed down within a group as a result of interaction between entities within an 
ecosystem (Furnell, Ward, Jungle). As there are around 1.7 billion individuals online (Nye), it makes 
sense to determine that the number of predators is much less than the number of prey. As such, the 
majority of prey will never have an interaction with a predator (Furnell, Ward, Jungle). Therefore they 
will see no reason to adapt their current activities online and wonder why so many individuals are 
worried about these online predators. Indeed, as many items of malware have very subtle effects, some 
prey won't even realize they have been successfully attacked until it is too late(Furnell, Ward, 
Malware). This results in a comparatively small selection pressure on each member of the prey group, 
as it is distributed across such a large population (Furnell, Ward, Jungle). The small number of 
predators compared to the number of prey ensures that each feels the effect of selection pressure more 
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acutely. As such, “the predator will always need to improve faster than the prey” (Furnell, Ward, 
Jungle). However, online predators are granted additional benefits that their biological counterparts 
lack: They are able to target multiple groups of prey with a single attack, they are not constrained by 
location or time due to the interconnectedness of the Internet, and they can easily learn from successful 
techniques employed by other predators and share knowledge efficiently (Furnell, Ward, Jungle). 
These factors all combine to cause predators to be a potent force on the Internet, making it even harder 
to defend as a member of the prey population. This accounts for the ability of attackers to keep their 
capabilities in lockstep with advancements in security technology, as well as rapidly adopting new 
infection vectors as they grow popular with the population as a whole. It seems that as something 
grows popular, such as social media sites like Facebook or Myspace, attackers quickly react and find a 
way to utilize these new vectors to attack prey (Furnell, Ward, Jungle). After examining the biological 
comparisons, the rapid response and obsessive attention to detail demonstrated by attackers is 
understood easier.
Yet another source of difficulty in effectively defending from malware and cyber attack is the 
fact that organizations must be ever vigilant, even against their own members. As attacks are likely to 
come from both within and without (Machiavelli), organizations must also put security measures in 
place to defend against their own members. Though it may be easier to think of an attacker as someone 
from without, they are still able to be a disgruntled employee rather than a competitor attempting 
corporate espionage. Indeed, it was an employee who failed to secure full-time employment that 
attacked his company's system and dumped 1 million liters of sewage into the water (Curran, 
Concannon, McKeever). According to a poll of over 600 organizations, insider attacks consisted of 
21% of all cyber security incidents in 2010 (Henricks). This causes organizations to have to prioritize 
exactly what will be defended against, as they must pay the costs to defend against both outsiders and 
their own members (Orton).
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These are some of the factors leading to why malware and cyber attacks are hard to defend 
against, yet relatively easy to perpetrate. This problem poses a distinct disadvantage for nation states 
seeking to extend their dominance into this digital frontier, as it is so unlike the other four domains 
associated with military power of land, sea, air, and space (Nye). Due to the myriad reasons explained 
above, offensive maneuvers appear to be more effective than defensive maneuvers in cyberspace. As 
nations or organizations gain more and more capabilities by integrating with the Internet, they also 
expose vulnerabilities that would be otherwise unknown (Nye). This is why it is important to discover 
as much as possible about both offensive and defensive maneuvers in a digital frontier, so that the 
limitations and vulnerabilities can be understood and mitigated.
1.7.0 To Build or Not to Build
Before creating a potentially damaging piece of software, one should examine the pros and cons 
inherent in their actions. As such, the benefits of creating a new piece of malware will be examined 
first, these will serve as potential reasons to act in this manner. To provide a counterpoint, the 
drawbacks inherent in creating a new piece of malware will then be examined.
1.7.1 Reasons to Create Malware for Testing
Of the potential reasons to create a new piece of malware for testing, some stem from the 
benefits associated with gaining knowledge. Others are in attempts to prevent individuals from 
accomplishing nefarious goals. Still others are in an attempt to result in better software overall. 
According to Scott Orton, one must be able to think like an attacker in order to defend (Orton). It 
makes sense then that the best way to become proficient in defending systems is to learn how to attack 
them. As such, the creation of malware in order to learn how to be a better defender should be 
considered a noble goal. It is easy to imagine many attackers using this fact to their advantage and 
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claiming to be developing malware for purely academic reasons. Therefore, it is important that those 
who are actually developing malware for academic reasons take steps ensuring that their creations 
never escape into the wild.
Another reason to research and create malware is to prevent other individuals from exploiting 
systems for nefarious purposes. The SANS Institute reports that different teams are discovering the 
same zero day exploits without collaborating (Dhamankar, Dausin, Eisenbarth, and King). As such, it is 
understandable that a researcher who discovers an exploit while writing a new piece of malware may 
not actually be the first individual to do so. By sharing the data associated with the exploit they ensure 
that other teams who also discovered this vulnerability are unable to utilize it in secrecy for malicious 
purposes. However, this goal can be accomplished simply by analyzing software and determining an 
exploit without actually implementing a payload or propagation mechanism. Therefore if the goal is to 
simply discover vulnerabilities it should only be considered moral when creating malware that lacks 
these facilities.
Yet another reason to create malware is that it can be argued to create a more robust information 
ecosystem. As attackers and defenders are locked in a perpetual arms race to continuously improve 
their capabilities (Orton), this may result in better programs overall. Some individuals argue that “the 
long-term outcome of a continuing arms race is an improved retort against the unfriendly actions 
already performed by the opponent, and probably reducing the number of obvious new exploiting 
behaviors” (Carlsson, and Davidsson). It is important to note that in order to have viruses be a 
beneficial agent to the system as a whole, the final result should be one in which there is a balance 
between attackers and defenders and “viruses only in exceptional cases do harm” (Carlsson, and 
Davidsson). However, this goal seems unlikely at the current rate, as the effects of selection pressure 
are much greater on attackers than defenders (Furnell, Ward, Jungle). Therefore it seems that unless 
there is a massive shift in the way software is developed by placing security first, this balance is 
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unlikely to result. As such, this particular reason to create malware is questionable at best.
1.7.2 Reasons Not to Create Malware (For Testing or Otherwise)
Now that potential reasons to create a piece of malware for testing have been examined, it is 
important to consider the consequences of such an action. Creating a piece of malware in an effort to 
become a better defender appears to be morally justified. The next idea, creating an exploit without any 
payload, seems promising at first glance. However, upon examining several pieces of malware in the 
wild, it becomes apparent that this is a primary method for attackers to test attack vectors that will later 
be reused with payloads (Nugent, Raisinghani). Furthermore, revealing an exploit to the general public 
does not actually appear to be a good method of preventing others from utilizing it for nefarious 
purposes. The SQLslammer worm, the fastest spreading worm ever, utilized an exploit that had been 
discovered almost one year prior and still managed to infect over 75,000 hosts (Heidari). This 
combines with the delayed response time to the revelation of zero day exploits mentioned earlier 
(Dhamankar, Dausin, Eisenbarth, and King) to call into question whether publishing an exploit so that 
others cannot use it is valid. If anything, it appears that it may be used to allow certain individuals to 
create pieces of malware by grabbing published exploits and adding their own payload and propagation 
mechanisms.
The next question is whether it is right for states to create cyber weapons as an effective 
nonviolent arsenal. There are several contradictions in this area, but one thing that can be agreed upon 
is the fact that the Geneva conventions forbid attacks whose effects cannot be controlled or whose 
damage to the civilian population is disproportionate (Rowe, Ethics). One of the primary infection 
vectors appears to seed through many intermediate networks and systems on the way to the final target; 
this is in order to make attribution more difficult and defeat existing security measures. As such, it 
appears that the effect of the malware is quite difficult to control. This can be remedied by ensuring 
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that the payload only activates upon reaching the final target, but the intermediate systems still undergo 
damage in the form of wasted bandwidth and cpu cycles in an effort to spread the attack (Rowe, 
Ethics). Additionally, while the direct effect of the piece of malware may be nonviolent, such as 
disabling a power plant without firing a shot, the ramifications could lead to violence. This can include 
lost lives due to hospitals being unable to provide services to patients, accidents and general chaos that 
results from citizens being scared, among others (Rowe, Ethics). Indeed, some of the more promising 
targets for a cyber attack using malware (power plants, financial institutions, communication systems) 
are actually civilian targets. An additional question arises over how much damage to cause. As many 
attacks are against data, it is tempting to go overboard when causing damage in an attempt to ensure 
that some lasting damage is done (Rowe, Ethics). This can be solved by ensuring that the attack taking 
place is well-researched, precise, and utilizes only the minimum amount of force. However, as software 
interactions are an imprecise science at best, even the most well researched and precise attack could 
have an error in the code which causes massive collateral damage to the victim's civilian population. A 
final question arises as to whether or not developing a cyber weapon is cost effective. While there are 
extremely low barriers to entry in the development of cyber weapons and malware (Knapp, Boulton), 
each particular weapon is at peak effectiveness only once (Rowe, Ethics). Unlike a new missile system, 
the time and cost that goes into creating and testing a cyber weapon is something that an organization 
will not be able to reuse when attempting another attack. However, the costs associated with the 
creation and testing of a cyber weapon are so low when compared to traditional weapons systems that it 
may be a moot point. Regardless of the cost-efficiency of a cyber attack, it is clear that states will have 
to be very careful when developing malware in order to ensure ethical behavior.
A final reason for an individual not to create malware is the emerging legal issue. With the 
ratification of the Convention on Cybercrime, both the creation and intention to create malware are 
now a crime (Kierkegaard). While creating malware for testing purposes on private machines is not 
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illegal, there are still legal questions which arise about publishing an exploit which someone else uses. 
If a researcher discovers a new zero-day exploit and reveals it to the world at large without utilizing it, 
this is not a crime (Kierkegaard). However, if the act is considered a crime in any nation which it 
occurred, the attacker is held liable regardless of their own location (Kierkegaard). Therefore, if the 
vendor is unable to get a patch and an attacker creates a particularly devastating piece of malware 
utilizing this exploit, it is unclear whether or not the original researcher will be held partially liable. As 
the treaty has a provision for “other criminal offenses not defined by the convention” (Kierkegaard), a 
nation could easily define publishing an exploit which is used for crime as aiding and abetting. This 
would cause publishing an exploit which is used for a crime to be illegal if the result affects any 
systems in the nation which introduced this particular provision. This puts nonstate actors who are 
looking to publish security research in a difficult position, as they lack the political clout of a state in 
order to defend themselves from legal ramifications.
All of these rationals combine to form a grim picture for security researchers. It is increasingly 
important to maintain logs of own actions in an effort to prove that there were no criminal activities 
being undertaken. Additionally, it appears that the only valid reason to create malware is to learn how 
to become a better defender. Publishing an exploit that is discovered is suddenly a questionable act; 
only further actions by governments who ratified the Convention on Cybercrime will establish 
precedents on what is permissible in this new era. While those who are creating malware for criminal 
purposes will likely ignore the results of these new prohibitions, it is the researchers who find 
themselves in a questionable position.
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2.0 Background: “Good” Pieces of Malware
Now that the motivations and effects of malware have been established, it is possible to 
understand what makes an impressive specimen. By examining the current standard for vulnerability 
analysis and determining both pros and cons of such a system, the shortcomings can be realized. The 
alternative VIPERS system will then be analyzed as a potential replacement. Other effective 
characteristics of malware will be analyzed and placed within the VIPERS categories. Finally, the goal 
of the experiment will be examined: a cross-platform piece of malware. The problems inherent with 
creating such a piece of software will be explained as an addendum.
2.1 Current Standard: CVSS
The Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) version 2 is currently the standard used 
along with Common Vulnerability and Exposure (CVE) identifiers to define the name and impact of a 
particular IT vulnerability (Mell, Scarfone, Romanosky). CVSS v2 breaks each vulnerability into three 
distinct categories: Base, Temporal, and Environmental. The base metrics are utilized to enumerate 
items which will not change over time or environment; these include items such as how the 
vulnerability accesses the target system, how complex the vulnerability is to create or exploit, whether 
or not the vulnerability requires authentication in order to exploit, and how it effects the confidentiality, 
integrity, and availability of a system. The base metrics are the most essential components of the CVSS 
classification, and many vulnerabilities are simply reported as their overall weighted CVSS score and 
the base metric vector formed by combining all of the information within that category (Mell, Scarfone, 
Romanosky). Each sub item has three possible values; these provide gradation within the categories 
that the metric addresses. This category provides a good description of what the vulnerability actually 
does, as well as what is required for it to work correctly. This is very useful for organizations 
attempting to grade which vulnerability has the capability to be the most devastating and devote 
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resources accordingly.
The next category within the series of metrics is Temporal; these are items which may change 
over time. The first item is Exploitability, which determines whether or not the vulnerability has been 
proven to exist beyond theoretical abstractions and whether or not working example code exists. This 
factors into the overall threat of the vulnerability as an exploit with working code enables attackers 
with little skill to utilize it (Mell, Scarfone, Romanosky). Another subcategory within this metric is 
Remediation, which relates to whether or not there is a way to prevent this exploit from occurring. 
Vulnerabilities with no official fix are weighted as more severe than those which have workarounds 
published. The final subcategory within the Temporal metric is Report Confidence; this is whether or 
not the vulnerability has been confirmed by reputable agents. A fully confirmed vulnerability is 
considered more severe, as its existence is proven and attackers are able to acquire more information 
about how it works (Mell, Scarfone, Romanosky). All of these items are considered optional for filing a 
CVSS report. They have benefits to organizations prioritizing between different vulnerabilities, but 
offer little to no benefit to researchers attempting to determine the most effective pieces of malware. As 
such, they will be considered superfluous to the classification of a “good” piece of malware.
The third and final category within the series of metrics is Environmental; these vary by what 
particular information ecosystem a vulnerable system exists in. Example information ecosystems and 
their members include military, command and control infrastructures; financial, banking servers; 
commercial, inventory systems; and industrial, power plant controllers. Unlike the previous categories, 
some of the following are useful to determine whether or not a particular piece of malware is effective. 
As such, the analysis of whether or not each subcategory is useful will occur immediately after its 
description. The first subcategory within this metric is Collateral Damage Potential; it relates to the 
ability of an exploit to damage life, physical property, revenue, or productivity (Mell, Scarfone, 
Romanosky). Logically, those vulnerabilities that have the potential to inflict more damage are rated as 
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more severe than others. While this is interesting, the gradation within the category is inefficient for 
determining whether or not a piece of malware is effective; the only necessary factor relating to this 
category being if the specimen accomplishes its assigned objective. The next subcategory is Target 
Distribution, it represents the percentage of systems within the environment that could be affected by 
the vulnerability (Mell, Scarfone, Romanosky). The greater the proportion of systems within the 
particular environment that could be affected, the greater the severity of the vulnerability. This is 
another category that is partially useful for determining whether or not a particular specimen is well 
made. If the goal of the malware producer is to infect as many systems as possible in a particular 
environment, this category is important. If the attacker instead wants to assault a specific target, a low 
score in this category that includes the desired target is more valuable than a high score which does not 
include the desired target. The final three categories within the Environmental metric are the Security 
Requirements for confidentiality, integrity, and availability. Each of these items represents how 
important each facet of security is to a member of this environment, as they change dramatically 
between environments (Mell, Scarfone, Romanosky). For example, it makes sense that a clandestine 
service agency will care most about confidentiality compared to the other two facets of security. On the 
other end of the spectrum, public service utilities such as power plants will most likely care about 
integrity and availability most, confidentiality least. As these categories reflect how damaging a 
potential compromise of each of the facets of security is in a particular environment, they are not 
particularly useful when analyzing a specific piece of malware. Therefore these last categories are also 
deemed superfluous for the analysis of a well-crafted piece of malware.
While this system is valuable for organizations seeking to prioritize actions based on specific 
threats to their particular environment (Mell, Scarfone, Romanosky), it is overall less useful for 
researchers who are seeking to identify the paragon examples of malware. It does provide descriptions 
of what the exploit can actually accomplish and how it effects the three factors of security: 
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confidentiality, integrity, and availability. Additionally, establishing whether or not the vulnerability 
can be exploited remotely is an important piece of information. While the difficulty of creating the 
exploit and whether or not authentication is required does provide interesting information, they are 
unnecessary when determining the potency of a particular piece of malware. A glaring fault of the 
CVSS system is the lack of a benefit for being subtle. Utilizing this system, a piece of malware which 
changes the background to say “you have been pwned” would be weighted the same as a piece of 
malware which accomplished the same objectives without alerting the victim. Among other missing 
items, this demonstrates that the CVSS system is intended for vulnerabilities as a whole, rather than 
focusing on malware or cyber warfare. This demonstrates a need for an alternate system.
2.2.0 Alternate Standard: VIPERS Classification
In order to determine the gestalt of the effective characteristics of malware, it is necessary to 
create a different analysis standard. The VIPERS standard forms a vector without an overall score in an 
effort to enumerate the important facets of a piece of malware. The VIPERS system can be utilized to 
provide quick differentiation between individual examples by comparing along a specified axis or it 
can be used to gain a detailed view of a specific specimen. It is important to note that many of the 
sections require knowledge of the intention of the attacker, which can be problematic to acquire. As 
such, some sections will be extrapolations based on how the particular piece of malware interacted with 
its environment.
The classification is named VIPERS in an effort to provide a useful mnemonic to allow for 
quicker understanding of the system. The individual sections of the VIPERS classification are as 
follows: Virulence, Infiltration, Payload, Exclusivity, Remoteness, and Strength. Each section will be 
analyzed in order to establish how it benefits the classification system as a whole. Additionally, each 
section will be applied to an example in an effort to demonstrate an effective usage. As the VIPERS 
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classification is new, there are no preset numerical values associated with each section like CVSS. 
These are outside of the scope of the current project, yet may be addressed in future research.
2.2.1 Virulence: The raw infectiousness of a piece of malware. This section is intended to 
analyze whether or not the attack can compromise the desired systems. It also measures whether or not 
the attack can spread effectively, if so desired by the attacker. This requires extrapolation as to the 
attacker's intentions in order to make an accurate judgment. By establishing the attacker's goals, a 
researcher can examine the aftereffects of the attack and determine how effective it was. The section 
provides important data for measuring the effectiveness of a piece of malware, as even the most 
sophisticated payload is rendered useless if it can never reach a target. As an example analysis, the 
SQLslammer worm can be considered highly virulent, as it was able to infect the desired windows 
machines. Furthermore, it was able to spread swiftly from those machines to other vulnerable systems. 
However, the worm's random number generator did have a bug which prevented it from attacking a 
large group of potential victims (Heidari). If this bug hadn't existed, the worm would have been 
considered extremely virulent. 
2.2.2 Infiltration: The subtlety of a piece of malware. This section analyzes whether or not the 
attack is able to perform its mission while remaining undetected. This has many gradations, and is often 
opposed to virulence. For example, scanning worms such as the SQLslammer generate anomalous 
communications in an attempt to infect as many systems as possible, this increases its likelihood of 
being detected (Weaver, Paxson, Staniford, Cunningham). This is an important category for a piece of 
malware, as a subtle attack that goes unnoticed can be used for several purposes. It can silently report 
all data from the infected machine, it can be used to lace the infected system with backdoors to 
facilitate further attacks, or it can lie in wait for additional instructions in addition to performing its 
main objective (Weaver, Paxson, Staniford, Cunningham). One form of particularly subtle attack is the 
installation of a rootkit. Assuming that the initial compromise is handled stealthily, the actual rootkit 
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infects the system and then often changes the operating system reporting instructions to hide its 
presence (McAfee). Boot disk scans are redirected to copies of the uninfected boot disk in an effort to 
hide any sign of the system being compromised (McAfee). As such, many rootkits go completely 
unnoticed until they are used for further ends.
2.2.3 Payload: The ability of a piece of malware to accomplish its goal. This section is used to 
determine whether or not the function performed by the malware is truly effective. Like virulence, this 
section does require some extrapolation as to what the goal of the attacker was. In many cases, this can 
be determined by examining the code of the malware. If there is no payload, this means that the code is 
most likely being used to test a potential infection vector or demonstrate the existence of a vulnerability 
(Knapp, Boulton). Otherwise, the payload itself can be analyzed in an effort to determine what the goal 
of the attacker was. This is another important section to pay attention to for a piece of malware, as a 
well crafted payload can differentiate between a minor annoyance and a complete catastrophe. An 
example piece of malware with a known payload is the Stuxnet worm, which manipulated centrifuges 
in an effort to cause them to destroy themselves. While the complete impact of the worm will not be 
known for some time, if ever, the increased amount of mechanical failure in the Natanz plant 
demonstrates that the worm was effective (Nicoll).
2.2.4 Exclusivity: A multifaceted measurement made up of unique infections and system control 
guarantee. One of the base items within exclusivity is whether or not a piece of malware will waste 
resources by reinfecting a machine which has already been subverted. This is different than hiding 
copies of itself in an infected machine, as will be discussed in the strength section. The property of 
unique infection is important to consider as it both benefits subtlety and demonstrates a more efficient 
piece of malware. An example of this particular type of exclusive malware is a scanning worm which 
will not try to reinfect a system that it gets a connection to. This can be accomplished through a variety 
of methods, but an efficient and subtle version would be one which does not bother scanning that 
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particular address anymore. This will both cut down on potentially anomalous traffic as well as not 
wasting precious resources.
The other subcategory is that of system control guarantee. This treats each compromised system 
as an investment and seeks to ensure that the only piece of malware compromising the system is the 
one being examined. It is important to consider this when creating malware as the presence of other 
vulnerabilities prevents the attacker from guaranteeing the new functionality of the system. Additional 
pieces of malware can allow other attackers to exploit the newly controlled machines; they can even 
draw attention to the fact that the system is compromised if they behave less subtly than the original 
attack. Historical examples of malware which behave in this manner are the Bagel, MyDoom, and 
Netsky worms (Heidari). Each one installed their own payload and also removed instances of the other 
worms in an attempt to guarantee system control to the attacker (Heidari). Another example is the 
prevalent tactic among attackers to compromise a system and then patch it in an effort to prevent others 
from subverting the system in the same manner (Orton).
2.2.5 Remoteness: Another multifaceted measurement which consists of access requirements, 
remote activation, and remote control. Access requirements are one of the simpler factors, dedicated to 
determining whether or not the piece of malware is able to compromise systems from across networks. 
This is unashamedly mirrored from the Access Vector measurement of the CVSS base metric. As such, 
it is necessary for analysis due to the fact that an attack which can occur from anywhere in the world is 
substantially more powerful than one which requires local access such as a thumb-drive being inserted 
into a system. Examples of attacks which can occur across networks include web-sites which run 
malicious JavaScript in order to compromise a machine viewing the site (Dhamankar, Dausin, 
Eisenbarth, and King). At the opposite end of the spectrum, attacks which require local access include 
attacks over firewire or USB inputs (Mell, Scarfone, Romanosky).
The remote activation subcategory refers to whether or not the piece of malware requires 
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interaction with the user in order to be executed. If the attack is remotely activated, there is no user 
interaction required and the piece of malware is considerably more valuable. While effective social 
engineering can cause users to activate the piece of malware, as in the ILOVEYOU worm (Wassenaar, 
Blaser), these are considered less valuable as some users may not fall prey to the social engineering 
attack. Most worms appear to fall into the remotely activated category, whereas viruses are not 
considered to be remotely activated (Heidari).
The third and final subcategory relates to the ability of the attacker to modify or control the 
piece of malware remotely after distribution. Effective remotely controlled attacks allow for the 
attacker to change the way that the attack functions after the initial infection has been achieved. This 
allows for better adaptability to changing situations, such as the discovery of a new vulnerability that 
will allow for better propagation. Alternately, the payload mechanism may have been discovered and 
adjusting the attack after it has been released can help it remain effective. This adaptability inherited 
from remote control adds to the value of a piece of malware. It is important to note that the process of 
remote control can form several potential problems, maintaining secrecy being first and foremost. If 
there is a central entity sending updates, individuals analyzing infected systems can determine who is 
acting as the puppet master. Also, these anomalous communications could signal that a system is 
infected to any unaware individuals monitoring network traffic. A commonly seen example of a 
remotely controlled piece of malware is a zombie. These infected systems await instructions from a 
master attacker and are often utilized for other schemes at the attacker's whim (Heidari).
2.2.6 Strength: The ability of a piece of malware to resist attempts at removal. The strength or 
resilience of a piece of malware reflects any tricks bundled in to make it last as long as possible within 
compromised systems. This component comes into play after subtlety has failed and users attempt to 
reassert control over their own machines. It makes logical sense that a piece of malware which resists 
attempts to remove it should be considered more effective than one which is easily fixed. This can be 
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accomplished by seeding multiple copies of the malware throughout an infected system, or through 
even more devious methods. Polymorphic code changes automatically in an effort to prevent anti-virus 
programs from identifying it based on signature (McAfee). Additionally, some rootkits are able to 
survive reimaging the machine and simply reinfect the supposedly clean operating system installation 
by infecting the master boot record (McAfee). Other viruses utilize their strength to terminate processes 
associated with anti-virus programs; they ensure their survival by actively preventing attempts at 
removal(Furnell, Ward, Malware).
2.3.0 Justifying VIPERS
Now that the VIPERS classification has been defined, it is important to justify its existence. 
First, the comparison between the biological world and the digital world will explore two specific 
examples. Analysis of the successful criteria of a biological parasite and the VIPERS classification will 
shed light on the similarities between physical and digital malware.  Additionally, the importance of 
adaptability in the physical and digital world will demonstrate further proof. Next, the importance of 
subtlety as a metric for success will be proved. These will all combine to form a picture of why the 
VIPERS classification is necessary in order to understand the best of what malware can be.
2.3.1 From Biology to Binary
The similarities between the biological and digital ecosystems provide important information 
about what makes an effective piece of malware. Biological malware has had millions of years of 
evolution to reach its current stage of efficiency, therefore it makes sense for attackers to strive to 
emulate it (Furnell, Ward, Jungle). The criteria of success in a biological parasite are as follows: “it 
spreads rapidly and effectively, it does not cause such a violent adverse reaction in a host that it is 
rapidly destroyed, and that it is able to extract valuable resources from the host”(Furnell, Ward, 
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Malware). These criteria will be addressed in order to explain their representatives in the VIPERS 
classification system. Virulence directly represents the ability of a piece of malware to spread to other 
systems effectively, as well as if it can infect the desired systems. As such, the first criteria for success 
in a biological parasite is explained clearly by the VIPERS classification. The next criteria for success 
is encompassed by a combination of the infiltration, exclusivity, and strength sections of the 
classification system. By infiltrating a system and keeping a host unaware, the attacker prevents the 
system from having a chance to react in a manner that destroys the malware. As the exclusivity section 
of the classification directly benefits infiltration, it can also be considered to help satisfy this 
requirement. Additionally, if the execution of the payload causes the system to react to the malware's 
presence, the strength and resilience of the code will prevent its destruction. Therefore a combination 
of the infiltration, exclusivity, and strength categories satisfies the second condition for success as a 
biological parasite. The final condition of success is encompassed by the payload section of VIPERS. 
An effective payload will take advantage of the compromised system and extract valuable resources by 
satisfying any of the motivations provided in the introduction section. While some consider valuable 
resources only as items which directly lead to monetary profit(Furnell, Ward, Malware), one can argue 
that any resource considered valuable by the attacker fits this requirement. Therefore the virulence, 
infiltration, payload, exclusivity, and strength sections of the VIPERS classification directly satisfy the 
requirements for success among biological parasites.
The field of biology relates another important factor for success in a predator or parasite: 
adaptability (Furnell, Ward, Jungle). Selection pressure is so much greater on predators that it is vitally 
important for attackers to adapt in order to survive (Furnell, Ward, Jungle). Digital attackers should 
follow suit, which is represented in the remoteness section of the proposed classification. The remote 
control function of a piece of malware allows it to be adapted on the fly, thereby increasing its chances 
to both survive and thrive in the digital ecosystem. Additionally, digital malware has begun to evolve 
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towards remote activation, which demonstrates the adaptability of attackers as a whole (Furnell, Ward, 
Malware). As such, this important factor of biological success is also mirrored in the VIPERS 
classification system by remoteness. This final addition means that all factors of the VIPERS 
classification system directly correspond to what makes malware successful in the biological world. 
Therefore, it can be said that the system is effective in describing what should be held up as good 
examples of digital malware.
2.3.2 The Importance of Subtlety
As Sun Tzu states in the very first chapter of The Art of War, “All warfare is based upon 
deception” (Tzu, Cleary). Seeing how malware infections are often referred to as cyber attacks, it 
makes sense that there will be similarities between traditional warfare and cyber engagements. 
Therefore, one should aim to deceive the victim as to their true purpose when attempting a cyber 
attack. The infiltration section of the VIPERS classification is primarily concerned with subtlety and 
deception, as has been explained above. However, it is important to prove the necessity of subtlety in 
order to justify the existence of the classification. In addition to the lessons of previous military 
advisers like Sun Tzu, current military personnel also stress the importance of deception. These claims 
will be examined and applied directly to cyber attacks. An attack that was crippled due to their lack of 
subtlety will be examined next to provide a counterpoint. Both of these examinations will serve to 
prove the importance of subtlety in malware.
Master Sun Tzu makes several claims regarding the effectiveness of deception, which mostly 
boil down to one should appear to be the opposite of what one actually is (Tzu, Cleary). This sentiment 
is built upon by professor Neil C. Rowe of the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School, who reiterates the 
importance of deception in malware. The nine military-relevant types of deception are concealment, 
camouflage, disinformation, lies, displays, ruses, demonstrations, feints, and insight (Rowe, Duong, 
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Cutsy). Most of these have direct applications in cyberspace and will be examined in the order they are 
mentioned. 
Concealment is defined by the United States Army as protection from observation (U.S. Army); 
an attack which utilizes concealment would be a rootkit which has measures in place to prevent the 
system from reporting the infection. Camouflage is used to describe the process of blending into the 
surroundings and appearing as something different (U.S. Army); an example of a camouflaged attack is 
a Trojan. Disinformation involves “false and planted information” (Rowe, Counterplanning). An 
effective example of this is to seed false vulnerability reports in an effort do distract security 
researchers from actual exposures. Outright lies are easily understood and frequently take place as 
social engineering attacks. An attacker utilizing phishing techniques, such as claiming to need a user's 
account information in order to verify the security of an online bank account, is one prevalent form of 
this. Displays are “techniques to make the enemy see what isn't there” (Rowe, Counterplanning). A 
particularly devious example involves claiming that an infection was attempted, but foiled due to a 
user's anti-virus system, while secretly installing a rootkit. This increases user confidence in their 
existing protections while secretly subverting their machine. Ruses are defined as “using enemy 
equipment and procedures” (Rowe, Counterplanning) and are often employed as identity theft. They 
have lost some of their effectiveness overtime however, as “identity theft is easy and lacks surprise” 
(Rowe, Counterplanning); this constant exposure causes individuals to not easily trust claims of online 
identity. Demonstrations of capabilities are primarily used as a show of strength to discourage attack 
while not actually engaging the enemy (U.S. Army). These are less effective in cyberspace, as a 
demonstration of strength without actually making contact with a system is hard to accomplish 
(Miller). Feints are false attacks which engage the enemy in a different location than the actual attack 
(U.S. Army). These can be very useful in cyberspace when attacking human adversaries. By attacking a 
location and drawing attention to it, the adversary will traditionally make another point of their defense 
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weaker; this weakening allows the attacker to achieve a decisive victory at the desired location (Tzu, 
Cleary). The final category of military-relevant deception is insight; it is defined as “deceiving the 
opponent by out thinking him” (Rowe, Counterplanning). An example of insight employed in cyber 
attacks is a multiple stage attack. By bringing an organization's primary servers down utilizing a DDOS 
attack, an attacker can count on the defender bringing their backup servers online. As backup servers 
are traditionally less secure than primary servers (Think Smarter), the attacker can then utilize this 
knowledge to compromise the backups as they come online. The attacker has successfully anticipated 
the opponent's maneuvers and planned accordingly.
These aspects of military deception and their applications all serve to demonstrate the 
importance of subtlety in cyber attacks. As a counterpoint to effective operating methods, a historical 
example will demonstrate what happens when a piece of malware does not follow these guidelines. The 
Nimda worm combined effective strategies from two previous worms in order to become extremely 
virulent (Wassenaar, Blaser). The worm was released one week after the September 11th terrorist 
attacks on the United States and managed to spread faster than any previous worm (Wassenaar, Blaser). 
However, it was so virulent and released at such a reactionary time that the Internet community was 
able to realize the threat it posed and act quickly to stop it. Within hours of its initial release, system 
administrators were able to identify how to contain the spread of the worm and prevent a true epidemic 
(Wassenaar, Blaser). Had the worm employed subtlety in an effort to infiltrate systems before 
activating its payload, there is no telling how much damage it could have caused.
As these examples have shown, subtlety and deception are key to both physical and digital 
attacks. The VIPERS classification system is different from the currently used CVSS system in that it 
acknowledges this fact. Therefore it follows that researchers attempting to analyze what makes a piece 
of malware effective should utilize the VIPERS classification over the traditional CVSS system.
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2.4 Enter the Plaguebringer
The initial goal of this senior project was the creation of a truly cross-platform piece of 
malware. Here cross-platform was defined as a piece of code which would infect systems regardless of 
what operating system or processor architecture was utilized. The idea behind the malware was that the 
general code would infiltrate a desired system and then call home in order to dispatch a tailored attack 
to that particular platform. As the general code would call in a specialized piece of malware to fully 
compromise the system it had infected, it was named the Plaguebringer. 
The Plaguebringer would function in a similar manner to a military spotter. A spotter will travel 
light in order to avoid detection and infiltrate to an advantageous position as the companion to a sniper 
(Valdes). From there, they provide targeting information to the sniper and can radio in coordinates to 
artillery or close air support (Valdes). Likewise, the Plaguebringer was intended to infiltrate vulnerable 
systems and then radio in targeting information to a central entity. This central entity would then 
dispatch a tailored payload, equivalent to the sniper taking the assigned shot.
The justification behind creating a cross-platform piece of malware was the goal of being able 
to target the largest amount of systems. Doing so would also enable an attacker to catch a large portion 
of the Internet off guard. Just as biological viruses with broad host specificity are rare, so are pieces of 
malware which can impact multiple operating systems (Wassenaar, Blaser). This combines with ideas 
such as Linux being a more secure environment (Schneidewind) or that Apple OSX doesn't get viruses 
(Dilger) to form a large group of individuals who do not take security seriously. This appears to be a 
perfect storm which would allow an attacker to infect a large proportion of systems on the Internet.
The Plaguebringer would have accomplised this goal by attacking an application rather than a 
specific operating system. Applications often remain unpatched for longer than operating systems after 
a vulnerability has been discovered; thus applications have risen to become the primary infection vector 
for malware (Dhamankar, Dausin, Eisenbarth, and King). Furthermore, infected documents placed on 
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trusted sites are generally trusted by users; this would allow attackers to infect systems and use them as 
beachheads for attacking supposedly secure networks (Dhamankar, Dausin, Eisenbarth, and King). Due 
to the fact that Adobe Flash version 10 or below is utilized by 99% of Internet users in “Mature 
Markets” such as the US and Canada (Adobe Systems), it would make sense to utilize it as an attack 
vector.
2.5 A Stumbling Block
When researching the items necessary to create the Plaguebringer, several problems quickly 
emerged. First and foremost, malware is closed source and secrets of infection are jealously guarded by 
attackers (Rowe, Duong, Cutsy). Methods are employed to prevent decompilation and examination of 
the crafted malware in order to prevent other attackers or defenders from learning how the vulnerability 
was exploited. Additionally, vendors do not release working exploit code for fear of individuals taking 
advantage of systems which have not been patched successfully (Mell, Scarfone, Romanosky). As 
exploits written for Adobe flash are relatively recent developments compared to operating system 
specific worms, source code has yet to be released. This means that in order to develop the 
Plaguebringer, it would be necessary to write a new exploit.
There are a few problems inherent with exploiting a new vulnerability for a senior project. The 
first and most easily understood is a simple matter of it being outside the scope of a research project. 
More importantly, there are moral problems inherent with creating a new exploit. In order to prove the 
creation of such a worm, source code would need to be provided. However, providing source code 
would allow attackers to analyze how the exploit worked and use it for their own ends. Even if a worm 
was created without a payload, it would be a simple matter for other attackers to place their own within 
the code of the Plaguebringer. Even if the vulnerability was brought to the attention of the vendor, 
fixing vulnerabilities takes time. This gap would allow attackers free reign to exploit as many users as 
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possible before the vulnerability was fixed, as well as users still using older versions of the software. 
Seeing how some published vulnerabilities have taken up to two years to be fixed (Dhamankar, Dausin, 
Eisenbarth, and King), that is a substantial amount of users that can be damaged. Even using a 
utilitarian argument that the knowledge gained from creating the Plaguebringer would benefit the 
computing industry, the suffering generated by malicious attackers exploiting users would greatly 
outweigh this benefit. Therefore this action should be considered unethical under Utilitarian ethics 
(Mill). From a deontological perspective, Immanuel Kant argues that an act which harms other 
individuals can never be virtuous, regardless of the reasons behind the action (Kant). As the act of 
releasing source code that other attackers would exploit before the vendor was able to patch the 
software would harm users, the action can be considered unethical under deontological ethics.
If the creation of a new exploit for a senior project is unethical, there is one option left. Several 
sites sell exploits via a black market which directly supports cyber attacks. It is possible to buy an 
existing exploit and utilize it to generate a payload-free worm for academic reasons, but this also has 
problems associated with it. While the worm could be generated in a protected environment to ensure 
that any malware included in the purchased exploit doesn't spread, this does not address the primary 
issue. The purchase of an exploit through a black market would directly benefit criminals. In addition 
to the ethical questions relating to this purchase, there is the legal question. With the passing of the 
Convention on Cybercrime, it is unclear whether paying a criminal for information on how to commit a 
cyber attack for research is legal or not (Kierkegaard). While graduating with an amazing senior project 
is nice, graduating without going to jail is nicer.
These factors all combined to stop the creation of the Plaguebringer before it could begin. As 
such, the implementation section of this paper will be focused on several smaller examples which will 
not have catastrophic consequences for Internet users. While it would have been nice to apply the 
research into what makes a truly magnificent piece of malware, the research is still valid on its own.
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3.0 Implementation: A VIPER Examined
This section will demonstrate a few of the available methods to attack individuals on multiple 
platforms. The first exploit is an infection vector which utilizes script code embedded in public 
websites to attack unaware individuals. The next item is not an exploit but a method to disguise 
malicious activities in an effort to increase the subtlety of an attack. The next item is a payload, which 
can benefit from both of the previous items. By combining all three items, a fully fledged attack is 
created.
3.1 Virulence: Cross Site Scripting with Flash
The first of the methods to be examined is known as a cross site scripting attack, often 
abbreviated as XSS. This particular version is performed by embedding JavaScript into a web page; 
users view the page and the script automatically executes. This is often performed on Web 2.0 sites 
such as forums which allow users to upload content. An attacker picks a site, uploads their malicious 
script, then counts on everyone else who utilizes the site to be infected. However, many sites are 
realizing this fact and attempting to escape JavaScript that is posted onto them. This can be avoided by 
instead placing the JavaScript into a flash file and placing the animation online.
An example use of this tactic is to create an animated signature for an online forum. Some sites 
allow flash animations to be embedded in posts in the form of signatures. This can allow unscrupulous 
individuals to embed the malicious JavaScript within the animation itself. Placing the script within an 
animation avoids the automatic filtering as it is inefficient to decompile every potential animation 
placed on the site and check it for JavaScript; therefore web servers will most likely not attempt to do 
this. There are two methods which will be examined to accomplish the goal of embedding malicious 
code within a flash animation; the first is for ActionScript 2 while the second is for ActionScript 3.
The first exploit utilizes the getURL method of ActionScript 2. GetURL is used to link to 
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another website, but can also be used to call JavaScript functions. The standard syntax of the function 
is getURL(url [, window [, "variables"]]); where url is the location to be directed to, window is 
optional and determines what the result will be loaded into, and variables are optional HTML get or 
post methods. However, this can also be used to execute JavaScript code by replacing the url variable 
with “JavaScript: <script commands>”. This allows for an attacker to run arbitrary JavaScript with 
the site's permissions. Attackers can utilize this fact to access user's session cookies, as well as 
activating numerous other payloads. While getURL is traditionally activated when a user clicks or 
interacts with an animation, devious users can instead cause the method to execute right as the 
animation loads. The following is an example of one such attack.
class xss extends MovieClip {
// Constructor and other functionality removed
private function onLoad() {
getURL(“JavaScript: alert(\'This could have been very bad\')”);
}
}
As both getURL and onLoad were removed in ActionScript 3, attackers have been forced to 
adapt. The fundamental action remains the same, the only difference is in the functions utilized. In 
order to execute a JavaScript function, one now calls the navigateToURL method; which takes a 
parameter of type URLRequest. This request can also be written as JavaScript in the same way that the 
URL string was created in the ActionScript 2 example. In order to execute immediately upon loading 
the animation, the malicious code can be placed within the constructor. Alternately, the code can be run 
by adding an event listener to the MovieClip which will execute when the clip is successfully added to 
the animation. The following is an example of an attack which utilizes the latter method.
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// Ensure that all potential events will be recognized
import flash.events.*;
var myMovie:MovieClip = new MovieClip();
myMove.addEventListener(Event.ADDED, xssFunc);
function xssFunc(event) {
var xss:URLRequest = new URLRequest(“JavaScript: alert(\'This could have been 
very bad\')”);
navigateToURL(xss, “_self”);
}
Both of these example attacks rely on being able to post flash animations online, as well as 
users having flash player. However, they do not rely on a particular operating system or processor in 
order to achieve their goal. Both can also benefit from disguising the payload located within their 
JavaScript, which will be described in section 3.2. As they are fundamentally the same exploit, both are 
also blocked by browser add-ons such as NoScript; these prevent the execution of flash animations and 
JavaScript without explicit user permission. Even so, they demonstrate effective web-based attacks that 
leverage the emerging trends of user contribution inherent in Web 2.0.
3.2 Infiltration: Disguising Malicious JavaScript
JavaScript is a functional programming language, which allows for functions to be defined and 
used in the same line of code. This provides an excellent opportunity for disguising malicious code as 
something else entirely. If the malicious JavaScript can be named x, then there exists an encryption 
function f for which f(x) does not resemble malicious JavaScript. If the creator of the encryption 
function then makes the inverse of that function g, such that g(f(x)) = x, they have the ability to 
disguise their code. By computing f(x) before writing the final file, they have a block of encrypted text 
which they can place within their attack. This results in the original malicious code being written as a 
block of encrypted text with a decryption function defined and applied all in the same line. If the block 
of encrypted text is large enough, which is influenced by the encryption function and can be of 
arbitrary length, it will be very difficult to find the decryption function.
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However, defenders have realized that a large block of gibberish will generally signify the 
presence of malware. This leads to the question of what the encrypted text should look like in order to 
not resemble disguised code. One potential option involves appearing incompetent rather than 
malicious. The encryption function will take a block of code that performs a legitimate function as a 
base argument. Then, the function will take the desired malicious code and traverse it, replacing every 
ith character of the base code with the next character of the malicious code. The decryption function 
will simply keep every ith character of the encrypted text and discard everything else. While it is 
extremely unlikely that the resulting block of text is executable code, it should remain close enough to 
pass a casual inspection. By formatting the resulting block extremely poorly, it will be even more 
difficult to read and allow for the decryption function to be embedded secretly. These factors will 
combine to result in code that appears to have been made by someone with little to no actual 
programming skill. The resulting opinion towards the code is that it is simply broken, which is an 
effective disguise as it will actually be a functional attack. 
As a side note, attackers should be very careful in the selection of the legitimate base code. It 
should be complex enough that examination of changed characters will not easily demonstrate the 
maliciousness of the code, but should also have no association whatsoever with the attacker. If the 
attacker utilized published code which they were affiliated with, individuals analyzing the malicious 
code could have legitimate suspicious relating to the identity of the attacker. Selecting code published 
by an opponent is one option, but individuals analyzing the attack may correctly guess that someone is 
trying to pass blame to an enemy. As such, the safest choice for code is something with no relationship, 
good or bad, to the attacker.
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3.3 Payload: Heap Spraying and Shellcode
One payload available is known as a heap spraying attack. This can be employed using 
JavaScript to fill a large portion of the heap with shellcode. In this instance shellcode is machine code 
which is used to perform malicious actions. Machine code is generally specific to individual platforms; 
a combination of operating system model, operating system version, as well as processor architecture 
(Offensive Security). However, it is possible to create a header which will operate on most machines 
and only execute the code tailored for that specific platform (Eugene). By filling the heap with multiple 
copies of the shellcode, attackers can exploit buffer or heap overflow errors and execute arbitrary code 
on a victim's machine.
By taking advantage of a heap overflow error, attackers overwrite memory and modify the 
pointer to a function; this is demonstrated in the aptly named Malloc Maleficarum (Phantasmal). 
Attackers change the pointer's address to the header of their shellcode (Phantasmal), which will then 
execute their malicious code instead of the normal function. Once the function is called, the shellcode 
executes and performs its duty. As the heap is dynamically allocated memory, the problem attackers 
face is knowing the address where their shellcode starts. If they point to an incorrect location, their 
attack will fail to work properly. One way to get around this is to guess an area and try repeatedly until 
it works or the program crashes (Sotirov), but this is inefficient and cannot guarantee proper 
functionality. It is possible to control the state of the heap using memory manipulation; this will 
provide a much greater chance of successfully executing the shellcode (Sotirov). While the example 
within Heap Feng Shui takes advantage of Internet Explorer (Sotirov), one can extrapolate that it is 
possible to commit the same actions on different browsers.
Because the heap spraying attack is executed in JavaScript, it benefits from the disguise method 
mentioned in section 3.2. Additionally, it can be delivered using multiple infection vectors, such as a 
flash animation on a forum. Combining all of the techniques yields an attack which is platform 
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independent, powerful, and easy to disguise. It requires user input in the fact that a user must view the 
infected page to become infected, but does not require local access in order to execute properly. The 
shellcode provided within the payload could allow for central control, as well as downloading and 
executing further malware such as a rootkit. The attack would need to be adapted in order to become 
exclusive and resilient, but this is possible to achieve using shellcode. Therefore the attack can be 
considered virulent, subtle, and remote; with the other factors of the VIPERS classification depending 
on the shellcode within the payload.
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4.0 Conclusion – The Internet Used To Be A Nice Neighborhood
The field of malware has changed rapidly since the early days of computing. The emergence of 
the Internet has served as a catalyst for improvements in software and hardware; these influence the 
capabilities of attackers worldwide. Just as capabilities have evolved, potential motivations for creating 
malware have also emerged. Increased selection pressure on attackers drives continuous improvement 
in an effort to meet and surpass advancements in security technology. Whether this will end up leading 
to a more robust information ecosystem or simply become another battleground alongside land, sea, air, 
and space is yet to be seen.
Regardless of the final state of play, the field of malware appears here to stay. While existing 
vulnerability classification systems do an admirable job helping IT professionals prioritize time and 
effort, they are inadequate for determining what is an effective piece of malware. As such, it is 
necessary to create a new system of malware classification, VIPERS. This system is unique in the fact 
that it rewards subtlety while also gauging the success of a particular specimen of malware. While the 
system lacks weighted scores for individual categories, it is still in its infancy. As such, further research 
is necessary to make VIPERS a fully-fledged classification system.
While the creation of the Plaguebringer was never completed, not all was lost. The underlying 
research applied to the examination of several smaller facets, which served to demonstrate the VIPERS 
system. Additionally, the wealth of existing shellcode online allows for interested researchers to build 
upon the framework provided to create their own pieces of test malware. This small attack serves to 
demonstrate the importance of patching client software in order to prevent widespread user damage. It 
also brings up the question of whether it is more important to allow users to express themselves fully 
online, in the form of animated signatures, or to prioritize security. It is the author's opinion that 
freedom of expression ends when it damages another individual, therefore sites should err on the side 
of caution.
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